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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from conviction in [a judgment of Bigamy, a 
third degree felony, following a guilty plea in the Third Judicial District 
Court, in and for Summit County, the Honorable IHomer F. Wilkinson 
presiding. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 
78-2a-3(2)(e) and Utah Code Annotated 77-35-26(2)(a). 
- iv -
COURT OF APPEALS, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, : REPtY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
vs. : 




The State cannot raise an issue that the Defendant pled guilty 
and then file an appeal based upon the fact th£t the State has previously 
consented to allowing the plea then an appeal. In the statement of 
Defendant filed at the time of the entry of the plea of guilty, said 
statement of Defendant provided Defendant does acknowledge that he does 
have a right to appeal the denials of the Motipn to Dismiss and Motion to 
Suppress in this case, said affidavit of Defendant was signed by Robert 
Adkins, County Attorney in and for Summit County, State of Utah and was 
accepted by the Court and is part of the recor|d in this case. Further, at 
the time of entry of the plea, the Court was advised of the additional 
paragraph acknowledging the right to appeal tl^ e Motion to Dismiss and the 
Motion to Suppress. (Transcript, page 43, liqe 18 through 25 and page 24, 
lines 1 through 8.) 
Further, the argument by the Respondent is frivolous and has been 
previously presented to the Supreme Court in %he State of Utah and while 
the Court has not made a direct ruling on thi^ issue, the Court has ignored 
the Respondent's position and has heard the appeal by the Defendant in 
these cases. Among the cases that have been ^ppealled to the Utah Supreme 
Court following a guilty plea with a reservation with a right to appeal 
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is the case of State vs. Stillings, 709 P 2d 348, wherein at the 
introductory paragraph of the case the Court acknowledges that the 
efendant entered a plea of guilty and then appealed and on appeal the 
Respondent argued that Defendant waived his right to speedy trial by 
pleading guilty to the charges and argued that a Defendant cannot plead 
guilty and then appeal. (A copy of the Brief of Respondent in the case of 
State vs. Stillings, and a copy of the Reply Brief of the Appellant are 
attached in the Addendum. 
POINT II 
The facts of the case clearly infer that Appellant did not claim 
religious reasons for practicing polygamy. The State has conceded that the 
facts in this case are different than a typical polygamy case in that (1) 
the wives of the Appellant have reported the unlawful act to the 
authorities "the wives of the Defendant have reported the unlawful acts to 
the authorities, whereas in a polygamist situation, the wives do not aide 
the authorities in the prosecution of the Defendant"; (2) that the 
Appellant actually obtained a marriage license and when through a formal 
ceremony, whereas the affiance understanding of a polygamist marriage, is 
that a license is not obtained and a formally sanctioned ceremony is not 
held; and (3) the wives of the Appellant did not know that the Appellant 
had been previously been married at the time of their marriage whereas in a 
polygamist relationship, the "wives" apparently know of the previous wives. 
(Affidavit of Robert Adkins, County Attorney, Summit County, State of Utah, 
pages 24 through 26 of the record. 
STATE OF UTAH vs. DAVID BRUCE GEER 
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The State argues that the bigamy statute is not being selectively 
enforced but failed to cite any cases anywhere in the State of Utah within 
the last thirty years where a polygamy case hap been prosecuted by the 
State, even tend to cite a decision in the case of Potter vs. Murray City, 
760 F 2d 1065, (10th Cir. 1985) in their argument as basis for not finding 
selective prosecution in this case. That argument is without merit since 
it is clear that if there ever was a case where the State of Utah could 
successfully prosecute a polygamist it was the Roysten Potter case and the 
State has made no effort to file charges againlst Mr. Potter. 
Further, the State admits that Appellant did not marry the 
victims as "a tenant of personal belief, the Defendant married women for 
fraudulent purposes and did not divorce a prevjious wife before marrying the 
next." (Brief of Respondent, page 17.) That the confession of the 
Appellant was tainted by prior unlawful conduqt of the police and whether 
the Court made specific ruling on whether saidl prior searches were illegal 
does not justify the Court allowing a tainted confession to be admitted. 
At the time that Appellant was arrested, he was advised that his property 
would have to be inventoried, (Transcript, page 14, lines A through 11), 
because the property would not be accepted in Salt Lake County Jail. The 
State has failed to prove that the property would not be accepted in Salt 
Lake County Jail, only the bare assertion of the investigating officer, 
Scott S. Mann. Further, after being told that the inventory search, the 
items found including checkbooks and address books were found in the search 
(Transcript, page 15, lines 15 and 16 and page 17, lines 8 through 10). 
STATE OF UTAH vs. DAVID BRUCE GEER 
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Following the discovery of the checkbook and the phone book, the 
investigating officer contacted several people who were listed in the phone 
book. (Transcript, page 17, lines 11 through 13.) The Defendant, on 
November 16, 1987, contacted the officers and indicated that he was willing 
to confess (Transcript, page 23, lines 18 through 24), and at that time 
made a confession in this case that is sought to be suppressed. 
As has previously been argued, it is clear that the confession 
came only after the search of the Appellant's luggage and brief case and 
contacting various people including one of the victims of this crime, 
Debra Syverson Geer. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's appeal is properly before the Court and the case 
should be dismissed for selective prosecution and/or the statements of the 
the Appellant and the property illegally seized from him during an illegal 
inventory search should have been suppressed. 
DATED this^22_ da^ of ^/^l ^f^ > 1988. 
STATE OF UTAH vs. DAVID BRUCE GEER 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I have mailed four true and correct copies 
of the above Reply Brief of Appellant to Barbara Bearnson, Assistant 
Attorney General, at 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
via jLirst-class U.S. Mail, postage prepaid th^ .s J^y day of 
y * w ^ g . _ 1988. 
Attorney for Appellant 
ADDENDUM 
Transcript, page 43, lines 18 through 25 
Transcript, page 24, lines 1 through 8 
Brief of Respondent; Statel vs. Stillings 
Reply Brief of Appellant; jState vs. Stillings 
Affidavit of Robert Adkins, County Attorney, 
Summit County, State of Utah, pages 24 through 26 
Brief of Respondent, page L7 
Transcript, page 14, line3 4 through 11 
Transcript, page 15, lines 15 and 16 
Transcript, page 17, line$ 8 through 10 
Transcript, page 17, line^ 11 through 13 
Transcript, page 23, lines 18 through 24 
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THE COURT: And it means that if you had a trial 
in this matter, nobody could force you to take the witness 
stand and testify. 
A. Oh yes, Your Honor. 
Q. Now, you also understand that the State would 
have the burden of proof to the satisfaction of all eight 
members of the jury beyond a reasonable doubt, that you 
knowingly had a wife when you purported to marry another 
one, £o wit: Colleen Edwards;you understand that? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. Are you presently under the influence of any 
type of medication, narcotics or fclcohol that would impaii 
your ability to exercise your firee consent? 
A. No, Your Honor. 
Q. You're doing this of your own free will and 
consent? 
A. Yes, I am, Your Honot. 
MR. GRAVIS: There is one additional paragraph to 
the standard affidavit which has been added;that Defendant! 
does acknowledge he does have a right to appeal the denial} 
of the Motion to Dismiss and Motion to Suppress in this 
case. I discussed that with Mr. Geer and our entry of a 
guilty plea in this matter is based upon the fact that we 
have factual evidence. 


























A. Yes. Later on in the afternoon/ I came back 
| and checked him out of the jail. 
Q. And did you take him to your office that after 
-noon? 
A. Yes, sir, I did. 
Q. And after you arrived at your office, did you 
have occasion to inform the Defendant again of his 
constitutional rights? 
A. Yes, sir I did. 
Q. And did he indicate to you that he understood 
those rights? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And did he agree to talk to you at that time? 
A. Yes, sir he did. 
Q. And did he make certain statements to you at 
that tine ? 
A. Yes, sir. We advised him that we were going 
to tape record his conversations and he agreed to that. 
And we proceeded for the next four hours he proceeded to 
answer questions and advise us and we made a transcrpt of 
that tape. 
Q. And during that conversation, did he say any-
thing to you regarding being married? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And did he make any statements regarding how 
24 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE $TATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
vs. 
STEVEN M. STILLINGS, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Defendant, Steven M. Stillings, respectfully submits this 
brief in response to point one of respondent's argument, claiming 
defendant has waived his right to a speedy trial by pleading 
guilty to the charges, 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant did not waive his right to raise a speedy trial 
issue on appeal by virtue of his guilty plea. The courts are 
divided, on the issue as to whether or not a defendant waives his 
right to appeal a speedy trial issue by virtue of a guilty plea. 
Although the Supreme Court of the State of Utah has not directly 
addressed this issue, in the case of StaJte v. Wilson, 453 P. 2d 
158 (Utah 1969), the Court was presented with a case in which the 
defendant, at time of trial, moved for a dismissal on the ground 
that the case had not been brought to trial within the 90 days 
provided by §77-65-1 Utah Code Annotate^, 1953 (as amended). The 
court denied this motion and defendant then entered a plea of 
guilty. The Utah Supreme Court heard the defendant's appeal and 
reversed on a speedy trial grounds, notwithstanding the fact that 
the defendant had entered a plea of guilty to the charge. 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 20480 
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In the present case, the defendantf by motion to the court 
on January 4, 1985, requested a dismissal of the charges based on 
the state's noncompliance with the Interstate Agreement on 
Detainers. Upon denial of the motion and after negotiations 
between the prosecutor and the defendant's attorney, a 
negotiation was reached in which the defendant plead guilty to a 
set of amended charges. In his guilty plea, the defendant 
specifically reserved his right to appeal the speedy trial and 
detainer violation issue both orally before the judge and in the 
expiation agreement which was filed with the court. It should be 
further noted that the defendant relied upon the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in the case of State v. Wilson, supra, in making 
his decision to plead guilty while reserving his right to appeal 
on those issues. 
There are a number of courts which are of the opinion that a 
guilty plea does not waive all pre-plea errors. This is 
particularly true in cases where the defendant specifically 
reserves his right to appeal at the time of entering his plea of 
guilty. 
In the case of State v. Ealy, 451 S.2d 1351 (Louisiana 
Appellate, First Circuit, 1984) at page 1352, the Court held "a 
defendant may, however, specifically reserve his right to obtain 
appellate review of pre-plea errors." See also, State v. 
McKinney, 406 S.2d 160, Cousant v. Hanmock, 580 F.sub 259 
(D.C.E.D.N.Y.) 1984), and Nycum v. State, 650 SW.2d 91 (Texas 
Appellant 1982) . 
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The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, in the case of U.S. v. 
Berg, 694 F.2d 632 CA9 (1982), likewise held "we recognize that a 
plea of guilty does not constitute a waiver of all defenses 
available to a criminal defendant. A guilty plea does, however, 
constitute an admission of all facts necessary for a conviction." 
A conditional plea of guilty specifically reserving the 
right to appeal the speedy trial issue, therefore, does not waive 
a defendant's right to have that issue decided on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this^QL day of July, 1985. 
Attorney for Defendant 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing brief to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, 
postage prepaid, this day of July, 1985. 
Robert W. Adkins #0028 
Summit County attorney 
Summit County Courthouse 
P. 0. Box 128 
Coalvil le, Utah 84017 
Telephone: (801) 336-4468 
Attorney for P la in t i f f 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
vs 
DAVID BRUCE GEER, 
Pla in t i f f , 
Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF ROBERT W. ADKINS 
Criminal No. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: s s . 
County of Summit ) 
Robert V. Adkins being f i r s t duly sworn on oath deposes and says: 
1. That he i s the duly elected, qual i f ied, and act ing County Attorney for 
Summit County, Utah, and i s the at torney for the State of Utah in the above-
en t i t l ed ac t ion. 
2. That during the a f f i a n t ' s term as Summit County Attorney, the aff iant 
has never been rquested by law enforcement officers or others to f i l e Bi^my 
charges, except against the defendant, David Bruce Geer. 
3 . The af f iant believes tha t the Bigamy s ta tu te i s const i tu t ional and 
should be enforced in a l l cases where the evidence wi l l support the f i l i ng of 
criminal charges. 
4. At the time tha t criminal charges were f i l ed aga ins t the defendant, 
David Bruce Geer, the a f f ian t did not know whether the defendant's practice of 
marrying more than one woman a t a time was based on religous convictions or 
otherwise. Whether or not the defendant has or does not have re l ig ious 
convictions in tha t regard does not matter to the af f iant in determining 
whether or not criminal charges should be f i l ed . Such information would be 
i r re levant to the a f f i an t in making a decision whether or not to charge a 
violation of the bigimy s t a tu t e . The only evidence that the a f f ian t took into 
consideration in t h i s case, or would take into consideration in reviewing any 
bigamy charges, was whether the defendant knew tha t he had a wife, and 
purported to marry another woman. 
5. The fac ts of t h i s case differ from other bigamy cases tha t might be 
f i led , because 
(a) the wives of the defendant have reported the unlawful ac t s to 
au thor i t i e s , whereas in a polygamous s i tua t ion , the wives do not aid 
au thor i t i e s in the prosecution of the defendant; 
(b) tha t the defendant ac tua l ly obtained a marriage license and 
went through a formal ceremony, whereas the a f f i a n t ' s understanding of 
polygamous marriages i s that a license i s not obtained and a formal 
of f ic ia l ly sanctioned ceremony i s not held; 
(c) the wives of the defendant did not know that the defendant 
had been previously married a t the t ine of the i r marriage, whereas 
in a polygamous re la t ionship , the ,f wives" apparently know of the 
previous wives. 
6. The a f f i an t has always been, and i s , wi l l ing to prosecute other persons 
under the bigamy s t a t u t e , i r respect ive of whether the those persons claim a 
religous bas is for tha t pract ice , and the a f f i a n t ' s decision in tha t regard 
will be based solely on whether there i s suff ic ient evidence to convict the 
person of the crime of Bigamy. 
DATED th i s / / day of December, 1987. 
Robert w. Adkins^ 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me th i s . ' 7 ^ day of December, 1987. 
My commission expires : 
NOTARY'PUBLIC, residing a t 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby cer t i fy tha t I nai led a true and correct copy of the foregoing, 
postage prepaid, t h i s / / day of December, 1987, to Martin Gravis, 2568 
Washington Blvd., Suite 204, Ogden, Utah 84401, at torney for defendant. 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OP THE STATE QF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
P l a i n t i f f - R e s p o n d e n t , 
- v -
STEVEN M. STILLINGS 
Defendant-Appe11ant . 
Case No. 20480 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant, Steven M. Stillings, was charged with four 
counts of Aggravated Robbery, first degree felonies, in violation 
of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302 (1978), and one count of being an 
Habitual Criminal, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-1001 
(1978) . 
Defendant was convicted of three counts of Robbery in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1978)* after a plea of 
guilty on February 13, 1985, in the Second Judicial District 
Court, in and for Weber County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Ronald O. Hyde, presiding. Defendant was sentenced by Judge 
Ronald O. Hyde on February 13, 1985, to three indeterminate terms 
of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah 
State Prison. 
STATEMENT QF THE FACTS 
In April, 1984, four informations w$re issued in Weber 
County, State of Utah, each charging defendant, Steven M. 
Stillings, with one count of aggravated robbery (R. 3, 199, 276). 
On June 27, pursuant to the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, 
the Weber County Attorney requested temporary custody of 
defendant from the Oregon State Penitentiary (R. 8, 204, 281). 
Defendant was transported to Utah, and arraigned in Weber County 
Circuit Court on August 20 on the aggravated robbery charges and 
an additional habitual criminal charge (R. 15-17, 206-8, 283-85)• 
Defendant waived the preliminary hearing and was arraigned in 
Weber County District Court on August 31, when the trials were 
set for November 20, 26, 28 and 30 (R. 21, 95-104, 209, 286). 
The court, sua sponte, moved the trial date up to October 31, and 
notice of the amended trial date was either served on or mailed 
to defense counsel on September 10 (R. 22, 210, 287). 
On October 9, defendant mailed a request.for discovery 
to the State (R. 23-24), and on October 18 he sent to the State 
and filed with the court a notice of alibi (R. 25-26). The State 
mailed to defendant's counsel an answer to the discovery request 
on October 24 (R. 28-29). On October 26, defendant moved for a 
continuance, claiming that he was unprepared for trial because he 
was having difficulty finding necessary witnesses and needed a 
court order allowing him unlimited telephone calls, and because 
the State had filed a late and incomplete answer to his discovery 
request (R. 34-36, 213-214, 290-91). At the same time defendant 
moved to compel discovery from the State, specifying in his 
motion several items not mentioned in his original discovery 
request (R. 37-40, 218-21, 293-96). 
On November 2, a hearing was held on the above motions. 
The court ordered defendant to file a more complete notice of 
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alibi in order to allow the State to provide him with the 
requested list of witnesses. The court also ordered the State to 
make available to the defendent the additional discovery material 
(R. 51-52, 104-138, 224-25, 299-300). The trial was then 
continued until January 8, 1985 (R. 50, 226, 30£). Defendant 
subsequently never contacted the County Attorney's office to see 
the material that the court had ordered be made available to him. 
Further, the State never received defendant's corrected notice of 
alibi, although it was filed with the court (the certificate of 
mailing or delivery to the State was never signpd by defense 
counsel) (R. 48-49, 163-65, 222-23, 301-302). 
On January 4, 1985, defendant moved tp dismiss the 
charges on the ground that the 120-day statutory time limit for 
trial had expired, and that the State had failed to comply with 
the discovery order (R. 53-56, 227-30, 314-17). After a hearing 
on the motion on January 4, the court denied defendant's motion 
(R. 64, 85, 156-89, 246, 259, 304, 347). On February 13, 1985, 
defendant pled guilty to amended informations charging three 
counts of robbery after the State dismissed the fourth count of 
aggravated robbery and the habitual criminal charge. 
SUMMARY QF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court properly dismissed defendant's motion 
to dismiss for the State's failure to try him within the 
statutory deadline of 120 days from his arrival in Utah. 
Defendant waived his right to a speedy trial and therefore to 
challenge on appeal the trial court's ruling by pleading guilty 
to the charges. Defendant also waived his right to a speedy 
-3-
t r ia l by requesting a continuance. Further, the continuance was 
not made necessary by the State, but rather by defendant's 
fai lure to serve a prompt and complete request for discovery on 
the State, and by his need for more time to contact witnesses* 
ARGUMENT 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS. 
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution 
guarantees the accused in all criminal proceedings the right to a 
speedy trial. The United States Supreme Court has held that this 
Sixth Amendment right is binding upon and applicable to the 
states by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment. S£SL Barker v. 
Wingo. 407 U.S. 514 (1972). Article I, Section 12 of the 
Constitution of Utah contains a similar requirement. 
The Interstate Agreement on Detainers, enacted in Utah 
in 1980, is a statutory provision designed, inter .aliar to 
implement the right to a speedy trial of accused persons already 
incarcerated in other jurisdictions. S£& Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-
5, Article I (1982). Article IV of the Act provides that after a 
detainer has been lodged against a prisoner in another 
jurisdiction, the appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in 
which an untried information is pending (the receiving state) may 
make a written request to the authorities of the state in which 
the prisoner is incarcerated (the sending state) for temporary 
custody of the prisoner. The authorities in the sending state 
must then make the prisoner available to the receiving state. 
Article IV further provides that once the prisoner has arrived in 
the receiving state, trial must begin within 120 days unless, 
-4-
after good cause is shown in open court/ the tri^l court grants a 
continuance. If trial is not commenced within the 120 daysf and 
no continuance has been granted/ the court is required to dismiss 
the information or complaint with prejudice. 
In the case at bar, defendant claims tljiat he arrived in 
Utah on August 17/ 1984. Although there is nothing in the record 
to indicate exactly when defendant arrived/ he was shown to be 
present at his Weber County Circuit Court arraignment on August 
20. On January 4f 1985f at least 138 days later, defendant moved 
to dismiss the charges against him on the ground that the 
statutory 120-day limit had expired and the trial had not begun. 
The trial court denied the motion and defendant claims on appeal 
that the denial was in error and that the charges should now be 
dismissed with prejudice. The trial court1s denial of 
defendant's motion was correct and defendant is not entitled to 
dismissal of the charges because he waived his right to a speedy 
trial and to the statutory remedy for violation of that right by 
both his guilty plea and his request for a continuance. 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY 
TRIAL BY PLEADING GUILTY TO THE CHARGES. 
Defendant moved to dismiss the charge^ against him on 
January 4/ 1985. The trial court denied the mo^ionf and on 
February 13 defendant pled guilty to informations amended to 
charge three counts of robbery instead of the originally charged 
four counts of aggravated robbery and one count of being an 
habitual criminal. 
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Although this Court has never ruled on the issue, in 
the majority of other jurisdictions the rule is that a defendant 
waives his right to a speedy trial when he enters a plea of 
guilty to the charges. Becker v. state. 435 F.2d 157 (8th Cir. 
1970); Fowler v. United States. 391 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1968); 
United States v. Blaunec, 337 p. Supp. 1394 (S.D.N.Y. 1971); 
People v. Hocking. 140 Cal.App.2d 778, 296 P.2d 59 (1956); Wixson 
v. People. 175 Colo. 348, 487 P.2d 809 (1971); Baier v. State. 
197 Kan. 602, 419 P.2d 865 (1966); Petition of Duran. 152 Mont. 
Ill, 448 P.2d 137 (1968); Fain v. State. 503 P.2d 254 (Okla. 
Crim. App. 1972); State v. Wilson. 25 Wash. App. 891, 611 P.2d 
1312 (1980). More specifically, a number of courts have found 
that a defendant waived his right to a speedy trial by pleading 
guilty even when he had raised the speedy trial issue at or 
before trial in a motion to dismiss. People v. Iversen. 82 
A.D.2d 895, 440 N.Y.S.2d 286 (N.Y. App. Div. 1981); Commonwealth 
v. L'ltalien. 3 Mass App. Ct. 763, 330 N.E.2d 214 (1975); Foster 
v. State. 70 Wis.2d 12, 233 N.W.2d 411 (1975); Graulich V. State, 
287 So.2d 114 (Fla. App. 1973); State v. McGee. 211 N.W.2d 267 
(Iowa 1973); State Y. Jackson, 17 Ariz. App. 533, 499 P.2d 111 
(1972); Woods v. Rhay. 68 Wash.2d 601, 414 P.2d 601 (1966); 
People v. Pritchettr 29 ill.2d 407, 194 N.E.2d 352 (1963). 
Similarly, in the present case, even though defendant raised the 
speedy trial issue in a motion to dismiss, his subsequent guilty 
plea was a waiver of his right to assert the issue on appeal. 
The record shows that defendant did not intend his 
guilty plea to serve as a waiver of his right to appeal the trial 
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court ' s denial of h i s motion to dismiss (R. 84, 138-44, 146-47) . 
Howeverf the defendant's in tent ion to preserve the i s sue i s 
i r re l evant . In both Foster and Graulich. JSHSXJL, the defendants 
claimed that they did not intend their pleas to cons t i tu te a 
waiver of a challenge to the speedy t r i a l i s su£ . Nonetheless, in 
both cases a waiver was found. In Foster , the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court sa id: wa defendant's expressed in tent tp reserve the issue 
of speedy t r i a l beyond a plea of g u i l t y does not change the . . . 
ru le . . . . The plea of g u i l t y i s not q u a l i f i e d by the intent of 
the defendant. • . . The judgment of convict ion stands." Foster 
at 415-16• 
POINT II 
DEFENDANT WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO A SPEEDY 
TRIAL BY REQUESTING A CONTINUANCE. 
On October 25, 1984, defendant moved to continue the 
trial date from October 31 in order to allow him more trial 
preparation time (R. 34-35). After a hearing on November 2, the 
trial date was continued until January 8, 1985, past the 120-day 
statutory deadline for trial. Thus the trial was continued at 
defendant's initiation. On January 4 Judge H^de denied 
defendant's motion to dismiss for failure of the State to try him 
within the 120-day statutory requirement, saying: "Well, you 
can't make a motion to continue it . . . and ^hen say 'Aw haw, 
you're past the time of the statute.' . . . I know that you 
cannot request a continuance and sneak past the trial date . . . 
I will not dismiss under this because you did make a motion to 
continue" (R. 172, 176, 187). Defendant now Appeals the denial 
of his motion. 
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Defendant cites to several cases which state that the 
statutory deadline for trial is mandatory and that the burden is 
•on the State rather than on the defendant to ensure compliance 
with the statute. However, none of these cases is applicable to 
the case at bar because in none of them was the delay at issue 
due to the defendant's own request for a continuance. This Court 
has consistently held that a defendant waives his right to a 
speedy trial whenever the delay complained about is a result of 
his own conduct or request. State v. Velasquez. 641 P.2d 115 
(Utah 1982); State v. Bonnyr 25 Utah 2d 117, 477 P.2d 147 (1970); 
see also State v. Taylor. 538 P.2d 310 (Utah 1975) (Crockett, J., 
concurring). In the present case, since the trial date was 
continued past the statutory deadline solely for defendant's 
benefit and at his request, he waived his right to a speedy trial 
and was not entitled to a dismissal. 
Defendant claims that he should not be charged with the 
continuance because the State forced him to request it. He 
alleges that the trial date was changed from the end of November 
to October 31 entirely on the court1s volition, and that he did 
not receive notice of the amended trial date until October 5. He 
then filed a discovery request on October 9 and received the 
State's answers on October 25. He claims that the answers were 
so inadequate that he was forced to choose between going to trial 
unprepared and moving to continue and compel discovery. He 
argues that at the November 2nd hearing the court ordered the 
discovery he had originally requested and granted the continuance 
in order to allow the State to comply with the order. However, 
the record belies defendant's description of these events. 
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First/ the record shows that the Weber County Clerk 
served on (or mailed to) the defense counsel notice of the 
amended trial date on September 10 (R. 22, 210, 287). Further, 
in both the hearing on defendant's motion to dismiss and 
defendant's Memorandum of Points and Authorities supporting the 
motion, defendant's counsel stated that he received notice of the 
new trial date on September 5 (R. 189, 232, 306). Therefore 
defendant received notice of the new trial date a month before he 
claims in his brief to have received it. Defendant is not 
entitled to complain that the State took too long in answering 
his discovery request when he waited until three weeks before 
trial before serving the request, a full month after receiving 
notice of the amended trial date. Second, in defendant's motion 
to continue he stated that he needed more time to prepare for 
trial because he needed more discovery .and because he needed a 
court order allowing him to make unlimited telephone calls to 
talk to potential witnesses (R. 34-35, 104-37, 213-15, 290-92). 
Therefore, defendant needed the continuance siniply because he was 
unprepared for trial, not because the State had furnished 
incomplete or late discovery answers. Third, the State's 
original discovery answer was complete with regard to what 
defendant had requested. The court order issued as a result of 
the hearing on the motion to compel discovery involved material 
not specified in defendant's October 9 discovery request; i.e. 
gloves seized from defendant's car, police broadcast tapes, 
insurance reports of the victims of the robberies, a comparison 
of the fingerprints found at the scenes of the crimes with people 
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named by defendant (R. 23-24, 51-52). Therefore, defendant's 
motion to compel discovery was not necessary to compel the State 
to furnish material that had already been requested, but to 
obtain discovery of new material, as the court found at the 
motion to dismiss hearing: "Your motion for discovery he's 
answered, basically answered. When Maurice [Richards, 
defendant's original counsel] was in here on the last one, there 
was new material and I made some orders in regard to it" (R. 
189) . 
Thus, defendant's need for a continuance in this case 
was not caused by the State, but rather by his failing to serve a 
prompt and complete discovery request on the State and his need 
for more time to contact witnesses. Therefore the request for 
continuance was a waiver of the defendant's right to a speedy 
trial and the protection afforded that right by § 77-29-5, and 
the trial court properly denied his motion to dismiss. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing arguments, the judgment of the 
court below should be affirmed. 
DATED this day of June, 1985. 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Attorney General 
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Q. Did you have a search warrant? 
A. No, I d id n o t . 
Q. What were you searching for? 
A. At that time we weren't searching for anything 
We had arrested Mr. Geer at the time at the airport. We 
had several large pieces of items that we were aware 
would not be accepted into the Salt Lake County Jail, 
that were going to h*ve to be placed in the storage room 
at the Organized Crime Office, We then advised him of 
this at the airport. Mr. Geer then told us that he wante 
to be present while the items w^re checked. 
Q. Ok. But ^ ou was hoping to find creditncards 
belonging to other people in th£re, weren't you? 
A. Not at that point. We felt like the credit 
cards would be on'him andXwe.vWohald discover those. 
Q. But you thought there was a chance that the 
items you were really lookin' f^ r would be in the suit-
-cases, isn't that correct? 
A. No. We felt like the credit cards would be 
on him, yes. 
Q. And you felt like it, but you didn't.know it? 
A. No, we did not know. 
Q. And it was possible that they would have been 
in the-suitcases? 
A. Very well could have been possible, yes. 
Q. Where did you find the credit card of Janice 
Rubens ? 
A. In his wallet. 
Q. Did you contact Ms. Rubens concerning the 
credit cards? 
A. Yes. Yes, had several contacts before the 
case as well. 
Q. After you discovered those credit cards, that 
Mr. Geer had permission to have them and use them, is 
that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And Mr. Geer was not married to Janice RubensJ 
is that correct? 
A. Well, we weren't sure at that time. 
Q. Ok. Where did you find the checkbook? 
A. Checkbook was in the briefcase. 
Q. Ok. Now, you were searching and you pulled 
out the checkbook and it had David Bruce Geer and Deborah 
Syversen Geerfs name on the chebkbookV is that correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And you ever been married, Officer Mann? 
A. Yes, I am now. 
Q. Ever been divorced? 
A. No, sir, I have not. 
















Q. That information is not included in your 
police report is it? 
A. No, I don't believe J.t is. 
Q. But you didn't suspect it was evidence of 
bigamy? 
A. No, 1 suspected that it was evidence of the 
bad check charge in Fulton County, Missouri. 
Q. ~: oYtu3££ound a phonebook in Mr. Geer's briefcase, 
didn't you? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. And you contacted several people who were 
listed in the phonebook, that true? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And now, the crime of fraud occurred in Miss-
ouri ?you weren't investigating that crime here, were you<| 
A. No, sir/ 
Q. You merely arrested him and is there any stat-j 
-ute that allows you to impound Mr. Geer's personal prop-
erty at the time of the arrest? 
A. What do you mean? 
Q. Take a suitcase and his briefcase where it wa^ 
not at that time considered evidence of a crirofe? 
A. Well, at that time we flo provide for the cust-} 
-ddy of that stuff, yes. We had no other place to put it 

























Q. And did you do that? 
A. Yes, sir I did. 
Q. And where did you store those items? 
A. In a locked area in the Organized Crime 
Bureaufs office. 
Q. And on November 16th, 1987
 # when you arrived 
at work on the morning-of that day, did you have any 
phone messages waiting for you at that time? 
A. Yes, sir. 
Q. And from whom? 
A. There were several of them. There were two 
of them from David Geer. 
Q. And did you initiate a telephone call to Mr. 
Geer at that time? 
A. No,sir. I went up to the jail and saw him 
. Q. And when you met Mr. Geer, on that occasion, 
what occurred? 
A. I talked with Mr. Geer. I asked him why he 
wanted to see me. Mr. Geer indicated that he would like 
to make a clean breast of everything and get everything 
squared away. He then asked us if we could check him out 
a jail and take him down to the Murray office where he 
could be comfortable, and where he could talk and that he 
would talk with us . 
Q. And did you do that? 
